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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether the "whistleblower" 
provision of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. S 3730(h), 
protects an employee who exposes allegedly false 
statements made in an application which contains no 
demand for payment of federal funds. Appellant, Dr. Keith 
A. Dookeran, filed a Complaint asserting seven causes of 
action against Appellees. Count I is a claim for retaliatory 
discharge under the whistleblower provision of the False 
Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. S 3730(h). Counts II through 
VII are state law claims arising out of the same facts. The 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees, dismissing Count I because it concluded that 
Dookeran was not engaged in protected conduct under the 
FCA, and then declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the pendant state law claims. We hold that 
the whistleblower protections apply only to actions taken in 
furtherance of a viable False Claims Act case which has 
been, or is about to be, filed. Because the facts of this case 
could not possibly support a False Claims Act case, the 
whistleblower provisions did not apply. We will affirm. 
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I. 
 
Dookeran was the Director of Clinical Oncology Trials 
and Research for Mercy Cancer Institute ("MCI"), which is 
part of The Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh ("Mercy"). Dr. 
Howard Zaren, the Director of MCI, asked Dookeran to 
author a grant application for MCI to be designated as a 
clinical center for the National Surgical Adjuvant Breast 
and Bowel Project's ("NSABP") study comparing the 
effectiveness of tamoxifen and roloxifene in reducing the 
incidence of breast cancer in post-menopausal women. This 
study is known as the STAR P-2 Study. Dookeran prepared 
the application for the STAR P-2 Study. Because of Mercy's 
alleged failure to commit appropriate resources to ensure 
the safety of patients, however, Dr. Zaren refused to submit 
the STAR P-2 application. Dookeran was directed by Dr. 
Thomas Mattei, Dr. Charles Copeland, and Ms. Susan Heck 
to submit the STAR P-2 application. Dookeran refused to 
submit the application for the same reasons as Dr. Zaren 
and because Dr. Zaren's continued role as the Principal 
Investigator and Director of MCI was in doubt. While 
Dookeran was on vacation, Mercy representatives obtained 
the STAR P-2 application, replaced Dookeran's and Dr. 
Zaren's names with the name of Dr. Hilberg, and submitted 
the application. Upon his return, Dookeran raised charges 
of scientific misconduct, arguing that the application was 
false and misleading and that his intellectual property had 
been wrongfully appropriated. Appellees allegedly ignored 
these charges and proceeded to retaliate against Dookeran 
for his allegations. 
 
II. 
 
Dookeran alleges that he faced retaliatory action in 
violation of the "whistleblower" provision of the FCA, 31 
U.S.C. S 3730(h). That section provides, in part: 
 
       Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, 
       threatened, harassed, or in any other manner 
       discriminated against in the terms and conditions of 
       employment by his or her employer because of lawful 
       acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or 
       others in furtherance of an action under this section, 
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       including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, 
       or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this 
       section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make 
       the employee whole. 
 
Id. We recently had the opportunity to articulate in 
Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176 (3d 
Cir. 2001), the elements of a cause of action under 
S 3730(h): 
 
       A plaintiff asserting a cause of action under S 3730(h) 
       must show (1) he engaged in "protected conduct," (i.e., 
       acts done in furtherance of an action under S 3730) 
       and (2) that he was discriminated against because of 
       his "protected conduct." In proving that he was 
       discriminated against "because of " conduct in 
       furtherance of a False Claims Act suit, a plaintiff must 
       show that (1) his employer had knowledge he was 
       engaged in "protected conduct"; and (2) that his 
       employer's retaliation was motivated, at least in part, 
       by the employee's engaging in "protected conduct." At 
       that point, the burden shifts to the employer to prove 
       the employee would have been terminated even if he 
       had not engaged in the protected conduct. 
 
Hutchins, 253 F.3d at 186 (internal citations omitted). 
Thus, the first thing Dookeran must show is that he was 
engaged in "protected conduct." 
 
We explained in Hutchins that for conduct to be 
protected, the language of S 3730(h) requires that the 
conduct be taken "in furtherance of " a False Claims Act 
action: 
 
       In addressing what activities constitute "protected 
       conduct," the "case law indicates that `protected 
       [conduct]' requires a nexus with the in furtherance of 
       `prong of [a False Claims Act] action.' " This inquiry 
       involves determining "whether [plaintiff 's] actions 
       sufficiently furthered `an action filed or to be filed 
       under' the [False Claims Act] and, thus, equate to 
       `protected [conduct].' " 
 
Hutchins, 253 F.3d at 187 (internal citations omitted). Since 
conduct is protected if taken in furtherance of an action 
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"filed or to be filed," we have noted that "employees need 
not actually file a False Claims Act suit to assert a cause of 
action under S 3730." Id. at 188. Nor do we require that an 
employee has developed a winning FCA case to be afforded 
whistleblower protection. Id. at 187. But courts do require 
that there at least be a distinct possibility that a viable FCA 
action could be filed. See Hutchins, 253 F.3d at 188; 
McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 516 
(6th Cir. 2000); Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., 
Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 867 (4th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. 
Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 741 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 
1269 (9th Cir. 1996); Childree v. UAP/GA AG Chem., Inc., 
92 F.3d 1140, 1146 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, to survive 
summary judgment, Dookeran must show there is a 
genuine issue that his activities could reasonably lead to a 
viable FCA case. See McKenzie, 219 F.3d at 516. If there is 
no way that Dookeran's conduct of informing Mercy 
administrators about the allegedly fraudulent application 
could reasonably lead to a viable FCA action, then the 
whistleblower provision provides him no protection. 
 
This is where Dookeran's case fails. As the District Court 
explained, there was no possibility that Dookeran could 
have filed a viable FCA action because the statutory 
elements of 31 U.S.C. S 3729 could not be met. Specifically, 
no "claim" had, or could have, been made upon the 
government. 
 
The False Claims Act provides: 
 
       Any person who-- 
 
        (1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to 
       an officer or employee of the United States Government 
       or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States 
       a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; 
       [or] 
 
        (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or 
       used, a false record or statement to get a false or 
       fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; 
 
       . . . is liable to the United States Government for a civil 
       penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than 
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       $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which 
       the Government sustains because of the act of that 
       person . . . . 
 
31 U.S.C. S 3729(a). 
 
"Claim" is defined by the Act as: 
 
       any request or demand, whether under a contract or 
       otherwise, for money or property which is made to a 
       contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United 
       States Government provides any portion of the money 
       or property which is requested or demanded, or if the 
       Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or 
       other recipient for any portion of the money or property 
       which is requested or demanded. 
 
31 U.S.C. S 3729(c). 
 
Thus, for Dookeran to show that he was engaged in 
"protected conduct," he must demonstrate that the 
application that he refused to sign was a "claim," meaning 
that it was a "request or demand . . . for money or 
property." Appellees offer substantial evidence and 
argument that the application at issue was not a request or 
demand for money. Dookeran offers no evidence to the 
contrary. 
 
Specifically, the application was a request that Mercy be 
designated a clinical center for the NSABP STAR P-2 study. 
It was not a request or demand for federal funds. Even if 
the application had been accepted (which it was not), no 
money, either federal or private, would have been paid to 
Mercy. The application was simply the first step in a 
process that ultimately might have led, but in actuality did 
not lead, to the authorization of the payment of federal 
funds to Mercy. That does not make it a "claim" under the 
FCA. Moreover, the uncontradicted affidavit of Joan 
Goldberg, the Chief Executive Officer of the NSABP, states: 
 
       The STAR P-2 application submitted by Mercy Hospital 
       was not itself an application for a grant of federal 
       funds. Rather, the application was a request by Mercy 
       Hospital to become a designated center for a specific 
       NSABP clinical trial for an approved protocol. 
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Clearly, the application was not a "request or demand . . . 
for money or property" as is required to be a"claim" under 
the FCA. Because the application was not a "claim," there 
was no possibility that Dookeran could have filed a viable 
FCA action. Thus, his activity could not have been taken 
"in furtherance of " an FCA action, as is required to 
constitute "protected activity" under the whistleblower 
section of the FCA. 
 
III. 
 
In sum, and for the above reasons, we will affirm the 
summary judgment for the Appellees. 
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